September 24, 2004
Innovative electronic surveillance systems are being developed to improve early detection of outbreaks attributable to biologic terrorism or other causes. A review of the rationale, goals, definitions, and realistic expectations for these surveillance systems is a crucial first step toward establishing a framework for further research and development in this area. This commentary provides such a review for current syndromic surveillance systems.
Syndromic surveillance has been used for early detection of outbreaks, to follow the size, spread, and tempo of outbreaks, to monitor disease trends, and to provide reassurance that an outbreak has not occurred. Syndromic surveillance systems seek to use existing health data in real time to provide immediate analysis and feedback to those charged with investigation and follow-up of potential outbreaks. Optimal syndrome definitions for continuous monitoring and specific data sources best suited to outbreak surveillance for specific diseases have not been determined. Broadly applicable signal-detection methodologies and response protocols that would maximize detection while preserving scant resources are being sought.
Stakeholders need to understand the advantages and limitations of syndromic surveillance systems. Syndromic surveillance systems might enhance collaboration among public health agencies, health-care providers, information-system professionals, academic investigators, and industry. However, syndromic surveillance does not replace traditional public health surveillance, nor does it substitute for direct physician reporting of unusual or suspect cases of public health importance.
The desire to expand and improve upon traditional methods of public health surveillance is not new. Even before the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent anthrax outbreak, public health officials had begun to enhance detection of emerging infections and illnesses caused by biologic agents. A primary objective of a 1998 CDC plan was to develop programs for early detection and investigation of outbreaks (1). CDC's 2000 strategic plan for biologic and chemical preparedness called for early detection by integrating terrorism preparedness into existing systems and developing "new mechanisms for detecting, evaluating, and reporting suspicious events" (2). Although the need for innovative surveillance techniques had already been identified, the anthrax outbreak after Bacillus anthracis spores were released through the mail in 2001 (3) accelerated the implementation of syndromic surveillance systems across the United States. An overview of the location and scope of the earliest systems implemented before and after fall 2001 has been published.
Analytic Methods for Signal Detection
The analytic challenge in using syndromic surveillance for outbreak detection is to identify a signal corresponding to an outbreak or cluster amid substantial "background noise" in the data. Syndromic surveillance systems use an array of aberration-detection methods to identify increases in syndromes above predetermined thresholds. However, signal-detection methods have not yet been standardized. Temporal and spatio-temporal methods have been used to assess day-to-day and day and place variability of data from an expected baseline
Distinguishing those points on which multiple investigators agree from those that are less well-delineated might be helpful in defining realistic expectations for syndromic surveillance. Investigators usually agree on the following:
Syndromic surveillance is being used in numerous states and localities to detect a potential large-scale biologic attack.
Pre-existing electronic health data will likely become increasingly available, thereby enhancing system development.
Syndromic surveillance does not replace traditional public health surveillance.
Syndromic surveillance is unlikely to detect an individual case of a particular illness.
Syndromic surveillance cannot replace the critical contribution of physicians in early detection and reporting of unusual diseases and events.
Although syndromic surveillance's ability to detect a terrorism-related outbreak earlier than traditional surveillance remains unknown, it will likely be useful for defining the scope of an outbreak, providing reassurance that a large-scale outbreak has not occurred, and conducting surveillance of noninfectious health problems (e.g., monitoring nicotine replacement therapy sales following tobacco-tax increases). However, integral components of syndromic surveillance require additional research and evaluation, including the following:
defining optimal data sources;
evaluating appropriate syndromic definitions;
standardizing signal-detection methods;
developing minimally acceptable response protocols;
clarifying the use of simulation data sets to test systems; and
advancing the debate regarding resource commitment for syndromic versus traditional surveillance.
On a broader policy level, defining the role of academic partners in bridging any potential analytic gaps, defining the role and scope of a national syndromic data repository, and developing policy for integrating laboratory testing and laboratory information systems with syndromic surveillance are on the horizon.
Farzad Mostashari, Don Weiss, Rick Heffernan, and other members of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene syndromic surveillance team provided data and program information.
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